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Abstract 
Estimates of Taylor rule equations for Federal Reserve policy over periods before the 
Greenspan period are misleading. Until 1979 Fed policy changed the real funds rate in 
response to the output gap, with no response to an inflation target. During the Volcker period 
the policy rule kept the real funds rate at a high but constant level, with no response to the 
output gap. Taking into account the regime shifts, a simple but effective funds rate equation 
can be estimated using only inflation and output gap. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is and has been a long-time interest in central bank’s reaction functions, or, in modern 
parlance, estimated policy rules. Modelling monetary policy reaction functions is important 
for a variety of reasons. For example, financial market practitioners need to understand 
policymaking in order to make sound forecasts of future monetary policy and to evaluate the 
likely direction of future financial market prices. Macroeconomists require a reaction function 
to endogenize policy in macroeconomic models. Many empirical analyses of economic 
theories depend on expected values of future variables that are linked to monetary policy, for 
example, the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates. 
 
Unfortunately, estimating central bank reaction functions has turned out to be complicated. 
The literature provides many studies, for many countries, containing mixed or contradictory 
results with respect to the significance of variables and the sign and size of coefficients.
1
 
There are several reasons for the empirical difficulties with estimated policy rules. First, in 
practice, policy decision makers tend to look at ‘everything’ and the range of possible 
explanatory variables is very large, both in scope and in their precise measurement. For a long 
time, economists were also strongly divided on how to actually measure the stance of 
monetary policy, arguing for or against alternative definitions of money and some policy 
interest rate.
2
 Furthermore, policy decisions are probably asymmetric and non-linear, giving 
different weights to variables under different economic circumstances.
3
 Also, policy regimes 
are subject to structural breaks, leading to multiple periods with consistent but different policy 
making. 
 
Since the seminal work of Taylor (1993) monetary economists have converged on the so-
called Taylor rule as a fundamental framework for most monetary policy descriptions. The 
Taylor rule simplifies the policy reaction function and focuses on two key economic variables 
that determine central bank policy interest rates: inflation relative to an inflation target 
(inflation gap) and the real economy relative to its long-run equilibrium (output gap or 
unemployment gap). These two variables are closely linked to the main goals of 
macroeconomic policy. Furthermore, focusing on these two indicator variables has been 
shown to provide a robust and reasonably efficient monetary policy in a wide variety of 
alternative economic models. More importantly from a practical viewpoint, the Taylor rule 
has shown to be a reasonably accurate description of monetary policy in several countries, at 
least for more recent time periods starting somewhere in the 1980s.
4
 Today, the Taylor rule 
has become a standard component of macroeconomic analyses, exemplified by the frequently 
used 3-equation small macroeconomic model (for example, Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) 
                                                 
1 For the U.S., Khoury (1990) found that there appeared to be little consistency in the results for the various 
explanatory variables. Smant (2002) provides a survey of studies of Deutsche Bundesbank reaction functions 
with similar results. 
2 Although consensus has settled on the interest rate as the measure of monetary policy, technically this is an 
assumption that depends on the structure of the market of bank reserves and the operating procedures selected by 
the central bank. See Bernanke and Mihov (1998). Incorrect identification of policy actions can result in 
seriously misleading empirical results, although the problem is most severe for high frequency (daily, weekly) 
data. 
3 For example, Bernanke and Mishkin (1992) stress the behaviour of central banks, switching between their 
inflation and real economy objectives. 
4 A cautionary note is that several monetary policy strategies can be shown to result in Taylor-type equations 
linking interest rate with inflation and the output gap. Therefore, althought the Taylor rule may work as a 
description of monetary policies, we cannot conclude that policy makers actually have implemented the Taylor 
rule strategy. 
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and the structural interpretation of the short-term interest rate in VAR models (for example, 
McCallum, 1983). 
 
Despite its appeal of simplicity, using the Taylor rule as a unified description of monetary 
policy over long time periods without taking into account structural breaks can have serious 
consequences. One example is that in tests of the expectations theory of interest rates, VAR 
models are frequently used to generate interest rate forecasts and to test theoretical restrictions 
on the model.
5
 Fuhrer (1996) reports that the performance of this type of model is seriously 
affected by the presence of structural breaks in the short-term interest rate equation. Taking 
into account monetary policy regime changes dramatically improves the relationship between 
the actually observed long-term interest rate and its theoretical value derived from forecasted 
monetary policy rates. Empirical failures of the expectations theory reported in many 
empirical studies may be related more to failing interest rate forecasting models than to a 
failure of the tested theory itself. 
  
The purpose of this paper is to re-evaluate the use of the estimated Taylor rule as a simple 
standard long-run monetary policy reaction function in macroeconomic analyses. I will 
largely follow Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and estimate Taylor rule functions for periods 
linked to various Chairmen of the Federal Reserve. The period estimates do indeed exhibit 
important regime shifts. The various regimes have simple but economically plausible 
interpretations. Finally, three different policy regimes are unified in a simple but effective 
Taylor-type reaction function that covers the full period under review and provides an 
accurate description of Federal Reserve policy over the period 1969-2009. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of 
important issues in the estimation of policy rules. Section 3 discusses the empirical estimates. 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
 
2. ISSUES IN ESTIMATING TAYLOR RULES 
 
The basic Taylor (1993) equation is 
 
tyttt yri βππβπ π +−++= )(
**  
 
where i, r*, π, π*, and y denote the federal funds rate (policy rate), the equilibrium real federal 
funds rate, inflation rate, target inflation rate and the output gap. Coefficients βπ and βy are the 
policy response coefficients to the inflation gap and the output gap. Taylor (1993) assumed 
for βπ and βy values of 0.5 and also assumed for r* and π* values of 2 percent, which seemed 
appropriate for Federal Reserve policy during the period 1987-1992. 
 
When estimating the Taylor rule coefficients as a description of monetary policy, the 
literature over time has identified several issues that need to be addressed.  
 
Real time data 
                                                 
5 These tests follow Campbell and Shiller (1987). 
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At least since the work of Orphanides (2001) the estimated policy rule literature has seen an 
increased emphasis on using real-time datasets.
6
 Not only do we need to consider the fact that 
official economic statistics become available after the reporting period, but, more importantly, 
some statistics are subject to major revisions, for example when at future moments in time 
additional source material becomes available and when definitions and statistical procedures 
are changed. An important part of this paper has been to collect a real time database to 
estimate the Fed’s historical policy rule. Specifically, the real time data I use in this study are 
‘first release’ data. By using the first released values for a given reporting period, I ignore 
publication lags which have varied somewhat over time and assume that Federal Reserve staff 
is able to predict contemporaneous values of variables using a variety of leading indicators. 
 
Inflation 
Inflation in the Taylor rule is most commonly measured by the annual change in the aggregate 
price index, Q/Q-4 or M/M-12. Somewhat more contentious is the precise measure of the 
aggregate price level that should be used. Reviews of Fed policy suggest that the Fed’s 
preferred inflation measure has changed over time. Historically the Fed used the GNP and 
later GDP deflator. In the February 2000 Monetary Policy Report to Congress the Fed’s 
emphasis changed to the PCE chain-type index. And in July 2004 the emphasis changed to the 
core-PCE index (i.e, excl. food and energy). The headline CPI appears not to have been in 
favour with Fed policy makers. 
 
I use the current (revised) data for the GNP (GDP) deflator in the estimations that aim to 
represent usual practice. In the second part of the analysis, using real time data, the definition 
of inflation is period specific. Real time inflation data are for the GNP/GDP deflator until 
1999Q4, PCE chain-type index from 2000Q1, and core-PCE from 2004Q2. 
 
Output gap 
The output gap has a long history in U.S. economic policy and was first introduced in the 
early 1960s as part of policy analysis by the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA).
7
 Official 
estimates were subsequently published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The Federal Reserve also produced its own estimates in 
preparation for the regular FOMC policy discussions, but data contained in the Greenbook are 
only available with a substantial lag. One important problem with the output gap variable is 
that potential or trend output is unobserved and must be estimated. Various methods of 
potential output estimation have been used in the literature, such as linear trends, quadratic 
trends, segmented trends, moving average or filter methods and structural or production 
function methods. Most importantly, available evidence shows that the (quasi-) official 
estimates of potential output have changed drastically over time. I use a reproduction of real-
time potential output and output gap values based on the analyses by the CEA, BEA and 
CBO. Information available at the start of every year is used to construct an expected 
quarterly time series for expected potential output during that year. These estimates of 
expected potential output are then matched with the first release data on actual real GNP and 
GDP to create a real time series of the estimated output gap. 
 
                                                 
6 Other important contributions to the real-time data literature are Runkle (1998), Keane and Runkle (1990), 
Diebold and Rudebusch (1991) and Croushore and Stark (1999). 
7 For a brief discussion see Orphanides (2003). It has been argued that historically the Fed has not actually used 
the output gap but tended to focus more on the unemployment gap. However, Orphanides found that the output 
gap did feature in the FOMC policy discussions and that official estimates and Federal Reserve staff estimates of 
the output gap were close. 
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Equilibrium r* and π* 
The Taylor rule includes an important role for the equilibrium real interest rate and the 
inflation target, both of which are in the case of the U.S. Fed not directly observed. For some 
other countries, such as Germany, central banks have long published inflation targets which 
could be used in the estimated policy rule. More commonly, r* and π* are estimated indirectly 
as part of the intercept of an estimated Taylor equation. Of course, this approach is only valid 
if we can assume that both r* and π* are on average constant over the sample period. The 
literature on both real interest rates and monetary policy’s historical struggle with periods of 
inflation and deflation suggests that constancy is a heroic assumption and a likely cause of 
structural breaks in the estimated policy rule. In the absence of further independent 
information on equilibrium real interest rates and U.S. policy inflation targets the best way to 
approach the problem appears to be to examine subperiods. 
 
Further specification issues 
Besides the question of possible additional information variables, some economists have 
suggested that real world monetary policy is (or should be) more forward looking than the 
basic Taylor rule.
8
 Specifically, policy makers may respond to expected inflation and/or the 
expected output gap. However, limited data availability usually prevents an appropriate 
examination of this issue. 
 
Another specification issue that has appeared in the literature is the possibility of smoothing 
and momentum effects in the policy target rate and the presence of partial adjustment 
dynamics in the policy rate.
9
 Although it is, for example, common to include lagged policy 
rates in the policy rule, interpretation of the empirical results is confounded by the possibility 
of autocorrelated shocks and autocorrelated missing indicator variables.  
 
The previous comments suggest that there is much room for debate on the appropriate details 
of any estimated policy rule. Without wanting to belittle any of the issues, the empirical 
analysis in the next section will take a simple approach. The objective is to obtain a general 
characterization of the main policy features, using only inflation and the output gap as the 
major explanatory variables. The objective is not to obtain a complete description of policy 
actions on a high data frequency. 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this paper I follow Judd and Rudebusch (1998) and proceed under the assumption that the 
Fed’s policy rule is affected by changes in the Fed Chairman. Table 1 presents the various 
tenures of Fed Chairmen, starting in the early 1950. 
 
Table 1 Federal Reserve Chaimen 
Chairman Tenure 
William M. Martin, Jr.  
Arthur F. Burns 
G. William Miller  
Apr 1951 – Jan 1970 
Feb 1970 – Jan 1978 
Mar 1978 – Aug 1979 
                                                 
8 See McNees (1986) for an early investigation of policy responses to economic forecasts. The forward-looking 
nature of an optimal Taylor rule was stressed by many, see for example Svensson (1997).  
9 The debate on interest rate smoothing, or its extreme version of interest rate targeting, has a long history and a 
large literature. Common in the Taylor rule literature is the partial adjustment model ∆it = ρ (it* - it-1), where i* 
and i are the Taylor rule target rate and the actually observed rate. Very similar in effect is the error correction 
model ∆it = ρ (it-1* - it-1). For a critical perspective on the issues and debate see for example Rudebusch (2002). 
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Paul A. Volcker   
Alan Greenspan   
Ben S. Bernanke  
Aug 1979 – Aug 1987 
Aug 1987 – Jan 2006 
Feb 2006 - 
 
Judd and Rudebusch find that their sample of quarterly data from 1970Q1 to 1997Q4 can be 
divided into three structurally different regimes, with the subperiods identified by the terms of 
Chairmen Burns (1970Q1-1978Q1), Volcker (1979Q3-1987Q2) and Greenspan (1987Q3-
1997Q4). The Miller term (1978Q2-1979Q2) is excluded from their analysis because of the 
relatively short time span. More formal statistical breakpoint tests could be used, and will 
probably result in slightly different break points but the empirical results suggest that the 
breakpoints are close to the change in Chairman. For example, Fuhrer (1996) identified 
breakpoints in 1974Q1, 1980Q1 and 1986Q1.  
 
Contrary to Judd and Rudebusch, who employ an expanded and dynamic estimation equation, 
I estimate the following basic Taylor rule equation.  
 
ttt yi γπβα ++=  
 
Here, in terms of the original Taylor rule parameters, the estimated coefficients are defined as 
α = (r* - βπ π*), β = (1+βπ) and γ = βy. It can be seen that the coefficient estimates from the 
Taylor rule are not able to pin down both the equilibrium real interest rate (r*) and the 
inflation target rate (π*). Following established practice, I will calculate r* as the average of 
the real federal funds rate observed over the relevant sample period. Because the maturity of 
the fed funds rate is very short the current, backward looking inflation rate is used rather than 
inflation expectations. In practice, any divergence between actual or ex post and expected 
inflation rates is more important for long maturity interest rates. Following the estimate of r*,  
π* is calculated as (r*-α) / (β-1). 
 
Estimating the Taylor rule model without further dynamics or any other short-term influences, 
introduces some econometric issues. First, there are questions with respect to the stationarity 
of the variables. We assume that we can effectively view the model as a cointegration 
equation. In view of the relatively short sample periods the use of special cointegration 
estimation methods, relying on asymptotic properties, does not appear to provide much 
benefit. Second, the absence of equation dynamics introduces residual serial correlation as 
well as questions about possible missing variables bias. Assuming that the missing variables 
bias is small, I proceed with the estimation using basic ordinary least Squares and Newey-
West HAC standard errors. 
 
 
Table 2 Taylor rule estimates for Federal Reserve Chairman periods using real time data 
 α β γ adjR
2 SEE DW 
Burns 4.271 
(0.700)a 
0.827 
(0.144)a 
0.440 
(0.116)a 
0.689 1.224 0.836 
 
 r* = 0.49 
π* = 21.88 
     
Volcker 4.366 
(0.986)a 
1.128 
(0.166)a 
-0.005 
(0.099) 
0.658 2.131 1.806 
 r* = 5.11 
π* = 5.79 
     
Greenspan 0.758 
(0.496) 
1.714 
(0.138)a 
0.501 
(0.065)a 
0.786 1.046 0.343 
 r* = 2.49      
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π* = 2.43 
Estimated Taylor rule equation: ttt yi γπβα ++=  where α = (r* - βπ π*), β = (1+βπ) and γ = βy. 
The estimation periods are Burns (1970Q1-1978Q1), Volcker (1979Q3-1987Q2) and Greenspan (1987Q3-
2006Q1). Full period is 1970Q-2006Q1. Real time data on inflation and output gap discussed in the main text. 
Newey-West HAC standard errors. a, b, c denote significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. 
 
 
Table 2 presents the estimation results using real time data on (policy relevant, i.e. mixed 
measure of) inflation and the output gap. Details of the data were already discussed earlier. 
For comparison, alternative results based on a commonly used dataset of current inflation and 
output gap data is provided in the appendix Table A1. Comparing current and real time data 
estimations, the results for each of the subperiods turn out to be very similar. A closer 
examination of the current and real time data (provided as appendix Figure A1) suggests that 
the major difference lies in the average level of the output gap in the subperiods, therefore 
affecting primarily the constant term of the estimated Taylor rules. Perhaps worth specific 
mention is the substantial increase in explanatory power of the real time data for the 
Greenspan period. 
 
The most important differences in empirical estimates are found in the comparison of 
subperiods. A remarkable result is the extremely high implied inflation target found for the 
Burns policy regime, estimated at 22 percent. However, this result is unlikely to reflect a true 
policy target value. Examination of the inflation and output gap coefficients shows that the 
policy regimes have to be interpreted very carefully. First, both the Burns and Volcker 
regimes suggest that the inflation coefficient is not significantly different from 1. Therefore, 
policy makers did not adhere to the so-called Taylor principle, i.e. raising the real interest rate 
when inflation is above target. Second, in the Volcker regime there is no significant (positive) 
response of the policy rate to the output gap. 
 
Whereas the estimated policy rule for the Greenspan period is clearly very close to the Taylor 
rule (with policy rule coefficients suggested of 1.5 and 0.5), the Burns and Volcker periods 
suggest a different interpretation is more likely. In the Burns regime, the policy rule appears 
to have been to respond with changes in the real funds rate (β=1) to the observed output gap 
(γ>0). The Volcker period policy rule appears to have been to keep the real funds rate (β=1) 
constant and at a relatively high level, but not respond to the economy (γ=0). Further 
interpretation based on the value of the constant terms suggests that the Burns regime does 
not appear to have had an inflation target at all, whereas the high target real funds rate in the 
Volcker period could be interpreted as depending on the stated objective of achieving 
disinflation. 
 
To summarize, one likely interpretation of the three policy regimes could be as follows:  
Burns: real rate = f(output gap), no inflation target 
Volcker: real rate = f(disinflation target), no output gap effect, 
Greenspan: Taylor rule model 
 
It is possible to combine the policy regimes in one comprehensive interest rate equation, using 
dummy variables for the Burns-Miller, Volcker and Greenspan periods (DBM, DV, DG). 
 
ttttt yDGcyDBMcDGcDGcDVcci *** 22211020100 +++++=− ππ  
 
Here, c00 is interpreted to represents the long-run equilibrium real rate and  
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One further addition is made to the interest rate equation in order to capture the short run 
policy reversal in 1980, with respect to interest rate policy and credit controls. Two dummy 
variables are used for the second and third quarter in 1980 (D80Q2, D80Q3). 
 
Table 3 Federal Reserve policy rule estimate using real time data 
 c00 c01 c02 c1 c21 c22 
Full period 3.440 
(0.582)a 
1.947 
(0.726)a 
-2.683 
(0.794)a 
0.714 
(0.149)a 
0.480 
(0.107)a 
0.501 
(0.068)a 
 adjR2 =  
SEE =  
DW =  
Greenspan 
period π* =  
0.729 
1.285 
0.991 
 
3.75 
    
Estimated equation ttttt yDGcyDBMcDGcDGcDVcci *** 22211020100 +++++=− ππ  
Additional included coefficients D80Q2, Q3 not shown. Estimation period is 1970Q1-2006Q1. Greenspan 
period inflation target is calculated as -c02/c1.  
 
 
Table 3 shows the estimates of the Federal Reserve policy rule spanning the period 1970Q1-
2006Q1. In addition to the interpretation of the various policy regimes as discussed before, we 
find a plausible estimate for the long run real interest rate of 3.44 percent. For the Greenspan 
policy regime the average inflation target is estimated at 3.75 percent, which is substantially 
higher than the previous subperiod-only estimate of 2.43 percent (reported in Table 2). For the 
Greenspan period we again confirm the Taylor rule hypothesis with respect to inflation gap 
and output gap coefficients (β =1.5 and γ = 0.5). 
 
 
Figure 1 Observed and fitted federal funds rate, 1969Q1-2009Q4 
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Fitted excl.D80: fitted value for the policy rule from Table 3, using real time data, but D80Q2-Q3=0.  
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Fitted curr full: fitted value for the policy rule from Table 2, estimated and fitted using current data and no 
regime shifts. Out-of-sample fitted values for 1969Q1-1969Q4 and 2006Q2-2009Q4 are also shown, assuming 
that the Burns-Miller and Greenspan regimes can be extended backward and forward respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the explanatory performance of the estimated policy 
rules. The first policy rule is the preferred estimate using real time data and regime shifts. The 
other policy rule is the full period estimate of the Taylor equation using current data. The 
difference in performance and the long run bias in the results can be clearly seen. 
The small out-of-sample expansions of the policy rule into 1969Q1-1969Q4 and 2006Q2-
2009Q4 are difficult to evaluate, but at first glance there is little indication of any regime 
changes. As a result we may assume that the estimated equation of Table 3, using real time 
data and taking into account the Burns-Miller, Volcker and Greenspan regime changes 
presents a simple but effective representation of Federal Reserve policy for the period 1969-
2009. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
Many empirical studies include monetary policy functions at some point in the analysis and 
their results depend on the accuracy of the policy description. Unfortunately, many empirical 
studies ignore the problem of regime shifts in policy equations, estimating only one uniform 
equation across the entire sample period. As a consequence, the results and conclusions of the 
empirical analyses must be treated with caution. One example particularly mentioned are 
some tests of the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates (see Fuhrer, 1996).  
 
In this paper I have shown the different results for a basic Taylor rule equation estimated for 
different Federal Reserve monetary policy regimes. The empirical results suggest a 
fundamental change in policy between the tenure periods of Fed Chairman Arthur Burns 
(1970Q1-1978Q1), Paul Volcker (1979Q3-1987Q2) and Alan Greenspan (1987Q3-1997Q4). 
The Burns regime focused on changing the real funds rate in response to the output gap, 
without a clear consideration of any inflation target. The Volcker regime consisted of keeping 
the real funds rate at a high constant level, without consideration of the output gap. The 
Greenspan regime closely follows the now familiar Taylor rule principles: increase the real 
funds rate in response to both the inflation gap and output gap. 
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APPENDIX Table A1 Taylor rule estimates for various periods using current data 
 α β γ adjR
2 SEE DW 
Burns 0.952 
(1.211) 
0.952 
(0.195)a 
0.796 
(0.134)a 
0.641 1.315 0.932 
 
 r* = 0.11 
π* = 17.70 
     
Volcker 4.778 
(0.710)a 
1.098 
(0.125)a 
0.023 
(0.117) 
0.702 1.989 1.928 
 r* = 5.26 
π* = 4.89 
     
Greenspan 1.277 
(1.065) 
1.467 
(0.438)a 
0.649 
(0.140)a 
0.407 1.739 0.068 
 r* = 2.35 
π* = 2.31 
     
Full period 2.820 
(0.864)a 
0.939 
(0.215)a 
0.151 
(0.205) 
0.418 2.662 0.290 
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 r* = 2.46 
π* = 5.82 
     
Estimated Taylor rule equation: ttt yi γπβα ++=  where α = (r* - βπ π*), β = (1+βπ) and γ = βy. 
The estimation periods are Burns (1970Q1-1978Q1), Volcker (1979Q3-1987Q2) and Greenspan (1987Q3-
2006Q1). Full period is 1970Q-2006Q1. Current data for inflation and output gap are based on GNP/GDP 
deflator and CBO potential output (vintage August 2010). 
Newey-West HAC standard errors. a, b, c denote significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. 
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APPENDIX Figure A1. Comparison of current and real-time data on output gap and inflation 
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Current output gap data are based on the CBO potential output estimate. Real-time output gap data are based on 
first-release GNP/GDP data and potential output estimates of the CEA, BEA and CBO. 
 
b) inflation 
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Current PGDP Q/Q-4 inflation is based on the current GDP chain-type price index. Real-time inflation data are 
first release data and reflect changes in Fed emphasis on GNP/GDP, PCE and PCE-core. 
 
 
 
